Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are increasingly conducting R&D in countries such as India and China, where intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is still weak. This paper examines the puzzle. The argument is that weak IPR leads to low returns to innovation and thus underutilization of innovative talents. MNEs who possess not only the capabilities to utilize these talents, but also the internal organizations to protect the intellectual properties will therefore find it attractive to conduct R&D at those locations. Following a series of interviews in major multinational R&D centers in China, a theoretical framework is presented to capture the interaction between firm strategies and institutional environment. Empirical findings from a sample of 1,567 U.S.-headquartered innovating firms are consistent with the hypotheses that (i) technologies developed in weak IPR countries are used more internally, and (ii) firms doing R&D in weak IPR countries have tighter internal technology structures. The results suggest that firms may be using strong internal linkages to substitute for the inadequate external institutions. By doing so, they are able to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities presented by the institutional gap across countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent years have witnessed a surge of multinational R&D activities in countries such as India and China, where the intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is still far from satisfactory. Technology giants such as Microsoft, IBM, Intel, and GE What has enabled some firms to act differently?
To understand this puzzle, I began with a series of interviews with the researchers and managers in some of the multinational R&D labs in China. Some common practices emerged, including intensive communications and collaborations with headquarters, patent applications in the home country, and internal project transfers across countries.
In particular, the projects are often closely integrated in the firms' global research agendas. The "carved-out expertise" -as called by some labs -is valuable only when combined with the complementary knowledge and resources within the firm. Even if imitation occurs, the value that can be taken away from the firm is very limited. The closely-knit internal innovation structure, therefore, serves as an immune system against the adverse external environment.
This observation suggests a framework to examine the original puzzle. In countries with poor IPR protection and poor institutional environment overall, local firms would find it difficult to appropriate value from intellectual products. As a result, R&D is discouraged and human capital is undervalued. This is in spite of the fact that these countries have a large pool of potentially valuable talent to conduct R&D. MNEs are in a unique position to arbitrage the difference in factor prices across national borders; their ability to do so stems from their internal organizations that can be viewed as a substitute for the inadequate external institutions. I call it internalization-arbitrage.
To articulate the interaction between firm organizations and external environment, I map the observations to a very simple, but logically contestable framework. It shows that MNEs may find it desirable to conduct R&D across borders when technologies are complementary internally. By keeping the complementary resources well protected, MNEs are able to leverage the strong institutions in the home country for their operations overseas. The viability of this strategy depends on a set of firm-specific and knowledgespecific characteristics.
I then seek empirical evidence of the theoretical conjecture, using U.S. patent data and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. I find supportive results that patents developed in weak IPR countries are cited more internally than those developed in other foreign countries. In addition, firms doing R&D in weak IPR countries feature significantly stronger internal linkages among their technologies than those who do not. The results are consistent with the thought that the internal linkages allow firms to appropriate value from their knowledge even in weak institutional environments.
The following section briefly describes my interviews in China. Section III sets up the theoretical framework and analyzes the potential arbitrage opportunities between different institutional environments. Section IV brings the theoretical conjecture to the data and sets up the stage for empirical analysis. The results are presented in Section V.
Potential caveats and robustness checks are discussed in Section VI. Section VII concludes and discusses future extensions.
II. THE CHINA STORY
Chinese colleges and universities are churning out nearly half a million science and engineering degrees every year, almost the same number as in the United States.
However, domestic R&D investment remains at a very low level; the still weak enforcement of IPR protection is often to blame.
In contrast, MNEs are streaming into China to tap the best talents in the country. By the end of 2002, more than four hundred foreign owned R&D centers have been established, hiring away the best masters and PhDs from China's top universities and research institutes. What enable the MNEs to succeed where the locals fail, besides their deeper pockets and technology advantage? With this puzzle in mind, I conducted a series of interviews with researchers and managers in some large multinational R&D labs in Beijing and Shanghai in the summer of 2002. 1 The observations suggest a key role of firms' internal organizations.
Organizational Structure
To utilize and appropriate value from the human capital in China, MNEs have to keep knowledge leakage at the lowest level possible. At the same time, China has a booming domestic market. Competition for market share requires that MNEs effectively transfer and adapt technologies for their local operations. This dilemma leads to a common practice among MNEs in China: the separation of localization-oriented R&D centers and research labs that aim to develop frontier technologies for global applications.
During the interviews, it was repeatedly emphasized to me that the research labs are a coherent part of the firms' worldwide R&D forces. For example, the goal of Microsoft
Research (MSR) Asia in Beijing is to "attract the most talented researchers in the field of computing" and to "advance the state-of-the-art in computer science research." IBM China Research Lab (CRL) has a mission to "create world-class information technologies and the underlying science which propel the world advances." Intel China Software Lab 1 Information has been updated through emails and phone calls during the past year.
(ICSL) hopes to "create and enhance global value of Intel's silicon, platforms and solutions by delivering innovative software technology and quality products."
With such missions, a research lab is usually a parallel organization outside of the MNE's local operations. It reports directly to the technology department at headquarters, connected with the firm's other labs by intranet, conference calls and project collaborations. Because the resultant technologies are aimed at global applications, intellectual property issues are mostly handled in the home country.
The centralized organization facilitates the coordination of research projects across locations, and therefore makes it possible to exercise the strategy of selective project assignments. Not only do the labs conduct very specific types of R&D, but also R&D projects at specific stages. For example, once a project gets close to commercialization, it may be considered "too risky" to stay in China. The firm will either intensify the monitoring or transfer the project to other locations. In other words, with the tight internal organization of R&D activities, the firm can make sure that the R&D activities in China do not expose too much value to risk.
The Internal Linkages
Unlike those in the localization-oriented R&D centers, the interviewees in the research labs did not seem to be concerned about imitation risks. When I asked the question:
"Given the weak IPR protection in China, are you concerned that the technologies would soon be stolen?" there are mainly two types of responses.
First, "they don't have the ability to steal." Researchers believe that the projects in their labs draw heavily on firm-specific expertise, a resource that can only accumulate over time inside the firm. For instance, the "Personalized Cartoon Generation and Animation" project in MSR Asia, which is later used in the most recent version of MSN Messenger PC. These are all considered major contributions in the field, but they themselves do not bring direct commercial value to potential imitators. "We don't count on the legal system for protection; we count on the technologies to protect themselves," a project manager said.
In sum, if technologies inside the firm are highly complementary, the leakage of a particular piece should not significantly affect firm value. The two types of answers described above suggest two potential sources of internal complementarity:
Because the generation of these technologies relies heavily on the firms' internal expertise, imitation is difficult without the context.
Because the appropriation of these technologies needs other internal knowledge and resources, the individual technologies do not bring direct value to the imitators.
The Time Trend
Why is this kind of R&D arrangement such a recent phenomenon? First, China -like other countries with relatively weak IPR regimes -has just opened its doors to foreign investors. Even after the initial opening up, the government required minimum local stakes in foreign invested enterprises, which almost ruled out the possibility of close integration. In fact, nearly all these research labs were established after the removal of government restrictions on wholly owned subsidiaries.
Another important driving force is the development of information technologies (IT), which has dramatically reduced the cost of international coordination. Firms need very intensive communications to make sure that the components developed in China fit seamlessly to the needs at the firm level. These efforts have been greatly facilitated by
Internet and the improvement in the local IT infrastructure.
MNEs have also gained more experience in organizing large-scale R&D projects and in dealing with the institutional idiosyncrasy in China. "They are gradually learning how to move smartly, and some MNEs learned their lessons the hard way," a researcher said when referring to the firm's earlier losses from counterfeits.
III. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The interviews suggest that firms may be able to use their internal organizations to protect knowledge, hence realizing the potential value of human capital in weak IPR countries. In this section, I map this idea to a logically contestable framework and show how technology complementarities, firm organizations, and legal institutions interact with one another. This framework serves two purposes: to help me study internalizationarbitrage in a structured manner, and to motivate the empirical study in the next section.
The Nature of Knowledge Diffusion
There are three critical steps in imitation: the motivation to imitate, the ability to imitate, and the possibility of getting around legal restrictions against imitation. In an institutional environment where the legal restrictions barely exist or are not effectively enforced, the first two factors can play a critical role in firms' IPR protection. They both stem from the very nature of knowledge flow.
First, the motivation to imitate is low when the value of the technologies is highly dependent on internal resources. Imitation is costly (Mansfield et al. 1981) , so it will happen only when imitators can profit from the technologies. Teece (1986) Second, the acquisition of complementary knowledge is subject to the constraints of geographic distance. It has long been realized that a multinational corporation is a geographically distributed innovation network, with the capacity to assimilate, generate and integrate knowledge on a worldwide basis (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1990) . Knowledge that is difficult to codify or teach can be more efficiently transferred within the firm (Kogut and Zander 1993) . Therefore, outside firms would have to face much higher costs to obtain complementary knowledge across country borders, if not altogether impossible.
From this perspective, the nature of knowledge creation and diffusion presents an opportunity for MNEs to overcome the weak institutional environment in the host country. On one hand, the internal complementarity of technologies makes the leakage of individual components less threatening. On the other hand, the constraints on crossborder knowledge flows enable MNEs to keep the critical knowledge under the protection of home institutions. The combination of these two makes R&D in weak IPR countries a feasible strategy. I will elaborate this idea in the following model.
Internal Complementarity
To focus on the organization of R&D activities, the analysis assumes away other factors that may affect the generation and appropriation of intellectual properties. For instance, large MNEs, with their worldwide production and marketing networks, are in a better position to use the new technologies in a large scale and a broad scope (Cohen and Klepper 1996) . They may also enjoy increasing returns to scale in innovation and at the same time face fewer financial constraints. Important as they are, these factors are not essential for this analysis. 2 Even if both technologies are imitated, it is still uncertain whether the integration process is replicable. The development of these technologies involves such intensive interactions within the firm that the synergy is not readily transferable. Rivkin (2000) shows that interaction among the elements of a strategy makes imitation difficult. This factor is abstracted from here to keep the main theme traceable. Not only is the stand-alone value V(a 2 ) exposed to higher risks, the internalized value 3 Firms can choose the organizational structures for their R&D even within one country. For example, R&D by small startups is common in the U.S., whereas large and diversified business groups dominate the R&D arena in many Asian countries. These organizational variances are assumed away in this model so as to highlight the cross-institutional implications; they are being studied in a separate project. 4 Theoretically, the gap in factor prices will be endogenously affected by firms' arbitrage activities.
However, this is beyond the scope of this paper, and should not be consequential unless we are looking into the very long run. The general equilibrium case is analyzed in a following project.
National boundary
becomes more vulnerable too, since one of the two complementary components is now in country Y. However, the internalized value stays within the firm as long as either of the two technologies remains exclusive. With strong IPR protection in country X, the internalized value is almost secured, and with strong internal complementarity, V(a 2 ) alone can be very small.
Compensating for the extra risks, the firm gains from the less expensive human capital in country Y. The cost savings are large if a 2 needs a large amount of human capital to develop. Of course, the extra coordination cost R has to be justified by the net gains.
Second, compared with strategy (ii), keeping a 1 in country X means that the values from innovation are better protected. The stand-alone value V(a 1 ) is safer, and the internalized value is subject to smaller imitation risks. The higher the imitation risk in country Y, the more advantageous it is to maintain part of R&D in country X. For purely domestic firms in country Y, even the internalized value is hard to protect because both complementary components are subject to the same weak IPR.
The cost of the better protection is the higher R&D expenses on a 1 , as well as the additional coordination cost R.
Therefore, the cross-border arrangement would be a preferable strategy if the expected returns from strategy (iii) is larger than both (i) and (ii). Clearly, the interaction between firm organization and external environment comes into play in the presence of internal complementarity.
Internalization-Arbitrage
I was faced with a puzzle: why do MNEs ever conduct R&D in countries with weak IPR protection? The answer includes an opportunity, and the ability to catch the opportunity.
Due to the poor IPR protection in some countries, local talents cannot efficiently realize value from their innovative activities. As a result, human capital is underutilized and underpriced. Such low cost human capital is attractive to R&D intensive firms if the firms possess alternative mechanisms to protect their intellectual property. One of the mechanisms, as identified above, is the substitution of internal organizations for external institutions, which allows firms to arbitrage the difference across countries. I call it internalization-arbitrage.
There are two main factors involved in internalization-arbitrage.
First, different R&D projects are different in their internal dependence. For example, software development in India and product-based technical solutions in China are very human capital intensive, but the value of these technologies is highly dependent on the firms' overall R&D architecture. In contrast, projects developed in the home country, such as system designs or key interfaces, tend to be more valuable on their own. The strategy of differentiated project assignment, in essence, is to tailor and allocate projects so that the firm can capitalize on the strengths of particular locations while minimizing the costs and risks. In particular, firms can examine their R&D portfolios and allocate R&D projects with stronger internal dependence in weak IPR countries.
Exercising this strategy, however, is not as straightforward as it seems. Depending on the technology field and the firm's organizational structure, it can be a challenge to carve out the right projects for weak IPR countries. R&D projects in the IT industry are usually easier to decompose than in those the traditional industries, where the lack of a comprehensive knowledge base in the host country would significantly affect R&D efficiency and thus compromise the cost savings.
Second, MNEs, by keeping the key components under a strong IPR regime, are in a unique position to protect the internalized value arising from internal complementarities.
With small imitation risk in the home country, having one project developed overseas brings little damage to the internalized value. Meanwhile, when the imitation risk in country Y is high, keeping the complementary components in the home country becomes critically important. Therefore, when the coordination costs are reasonably low, firms can actually leverage the home institutions for their operations overseas. The higher internalized value can also be considered higher leverage across countries. The example shows that internal complementarity can take on very general forms. The complementary component can be a technology, a firm-specific expertise, or simply the access to IPR-friendly markets. Firms can appropriate the value from R&D as long as the complementary components are not subject to the same high risks.
Of course, only those firms with sufficient organizational capabilities will find it worthwhile to set up R&D facilities in a foreign country, not to mention a country with very different institutional environment. The organizational capabilities differ widely across firms, depending on the their previous exposure to institutional idiosyncrasies, the experience in utilizing foreign technologies and resources, and the established routines of intra-firm knowledge transfers.
IV. EMPIRICAL DESIGN
The interviews and anecdotal stories are supportive of the internalization-arbitrage conjecture, but they are silent on how general the phenomenon is. In this step, I bring the idea to the U.S. patent data and construct empirical measures for the theoretical concepts.
Empirical Implications of Internalization-Arbitrage
The key insight that emerges from the qualitative analysis is the interaction between firms' internal organization and the external environments. Let γ k be the degree of internal linkages for technology k, which is owned by firm i and developed in country j, then γ k should depend on (1) the external IPR environment under which k is developed, and (2) the characteristics of the firm that develops the technology.
Within firm i, γ k is expected to be higher if j is a country with weak IPR protection.
Across firms, γ k is expected to be higher if firm i has R&D in weak IPR countries, everything else being equal.
Before getting to the empirical tests, I need to (1) quantify the IPR regimes, (2) describe the data sources and the sample, and (3) construct variables from the sample data. I will address the tasks in detail in the next five subsections.
Weak IPR Countries
Arbitrage opportunities exist in a country that has a substantial reserve of human capital, yet suffers from weak IPR protection. Referring to the World Development Indicators, I
exclude countries and areas that have under two million population, less than 1% of gross tertiary school enrollment rate, or less than five patents filed with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in the 1990s. 5 The reason for the screening is that a small human capital reserve can hardly justify multinational entries. The few inventors who do reside in these countries are very likely to represent extreme cases, which may cause biases rather than adding explanatory powers. The removed countries and areas are, for example, Belize, Trinidad, and most sub-Sahara African countries. For the same reason, I remove war-torn countries such as Croatia and Yugoslavia.
Six indices are considered to measure the institutional environment for IPR protection; they reflect different aspects of institutional environment and have been widely used in literature. The time horizons covered by these indices do not exactly coincide with each other. However, given the slow changes in institutions, these indices should be indicative of the IPR environments in these countries.
The first three indices apply to the general legal and political environment:
The The second set of indices apply specifically to intellectual property rights protection: Rapp and Rozek (1990) index. This index reflects the conformity of national patent laws with the minimum standards proposed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It covers about 97 countries, and pertains to the situation in the mid-1980s. Outdated as it might be, it is still a valuable reference on IPR environments of most countries. Ginarte and Park (1997) 
Patent Data
Despite the various criticisms of patent data, I choose to use the U.S. patent data for the following reasons (in addition to Griliches 1990; Patel and Pavitt 1995) .
First, to meet the criteria for patenting, a technology has to be novel, non-obvious, and useful. Therefore, using patent data allows me to eliminate the localization/adaptation type of R&D specific to the host countries, and instead focus on overseas innovations that can bring value to the whole firm -the home base augmentation type of R&D as defined in Kuemmerle (1999) . Moreover, because patents are the output of R&D, they capture the projects that fruitfully utilize human capital in various countries. for less than three years in the sample period. It is true that using Compustat data limits the study to publicly traded companies, but it also eliminates the incomparability problem between public and private firms, as these two types of firms are subject to very different operational constraints. Given the fact that public firms hold the majority of U.S. patents , they should be representative of innovating firms.
The Sample
I decide to focus on U.S.-headquartered firms in the empirical study. The reason is that I can obtain the most comprehensive data for U.S. firms, and at the same time avoid the potential administrative biases in cross-country comparisons.
The sample period is from 1993 to 2001, and I study all the patents applied during this period (and granted up to August 2003). Due to a typical lag of 2-3 years between patent application and patent granting, including the recently applied patents will bias the sample toward "quick patents," which may have systematically different characteristics.
At the same time, R&D in weak IPR countries is still a recent phenomenon. Extending the sample period further back will not add much value to the analysis either. I drop those firms that do not have any patents during the entire sample period and those three-digit SIC industries that contain less than three innovating firms. After data cleaning, the main sample consists of 1,567 firms in 92 three-digit SIC industries, whose patent output during the nine-year period ranges from one to more than 20,000 (IBM), averaging at more than 100 per firm.
This is a very skewed sample in the sense that the median firm only has nine patents, and that the top 25% firms filed nearly 95% of the patents in the sample period. Among these firms, 681 firms register positive utilization of foreign inventors while only 227 of them use inventors from weak IPR countries.
From these data sources, I am able to construct a rich set of variables for the empirical analysis. The key variables include the geographic distribution of a firm's innovations and the internal linkages among these innovations.
Location
Empirical studies using patent data often take the country of the first author as the location of the invention, partly because this information is readily available. However, given my focus on human capital utilization, I want to be very careful about possible 9 I thank Wilbur Chung for his help with the program.
distortions. In a patent with multiple inventors, which is often the case in cross-border R&D projects, a foreign inventor is likely to be the second, third, or fifteenth coauthor in the sequence. The first author's location may therefore bias against the involvement of foreign inventors, particularly those from developing countries.
To verify the possible bias, I track the addresses of all the inventors whose names are listed on the patent applications, and weigh the contribution of each inventor by his/her sequence in the inventor list. 10 Then, for every patent, I calculate the percentage contribution from different countries. Comparison between the first-author rule and the weighted-contribution rule confirms my intuition that inventors in weak IPR countries are more likely to be collaborating with inventors from other countries, and they are more likely to be at the tail of the inventor sequences.
In the following analysis, I apply equal weights to all inventors regardless of sequence. If more than half of the inventors are from weak IPR countries, then the patent is considered to be developed in weak IPR countries. If more than half of the inventors are from the U.S., then this patent is considered to be developed in the home country. The rest are patents developed in other (strong IPR) foreign countries.
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Accordingly, a firm is considered to have R&D in weak IPR countries if at least one of its patents is developed in those countries. The firm is considered to have foreign R&D if at least one of its patents is developed in a foreign country. It turns out that the classification criteria have important implications to the analysis, although my results remain robust across specifications. I will discuss this point in the robustness analysis.
The 227,034 patents in the full sample are described in Table 1 . The share of patents developed in weak IPR countries, small as it still is, has been steadily increasing over the last decade. Table 2 presents summary data for the 1,567 firms included in the sample. 10 There are no absolute rules as to the weighting, although higher weights are usually assigned to inventors listed at the beginning of the sequence. 11 For example, the Intel patent 5,677,862 has three inventors from Haifa, Israel and two from California, U.S.. Hence, it is considered a technology from Israel. This patent was later cited by another Intel patent 6,470,370, which is considered a US-developed technology as three out of five inventors are from U.S..
Internal Linkages
There is no direct measure of internalized value, but value can be proxied by usage.
Technologies whose values are highly dependent on internal resources are more likely to be utilized within the firm. Since "citations to patents that belong to the same firm" represent internalized knowledge transfers "leading to competitive advantage" , I use self-citations to proxy for the internalized value of each technology.
Presumably, the more a patent is cited by the same firm, the more its value is being retained inside the firm boundary.
Note that my measure of "self-citation" differs from that of in two important aspects, which explain the relatively higher self-citation ratios in this study.
First, HJT uses the patent assignee code as their unit of analysis. They acknowledge that "the same firm may appear in different patent documents under various, slightly different names," hence assuming different assignee codes. 12 Hence, "Dell USA Corporation" and "Dell USA, L.P." were treated as two different entities. To avoid this problem, the assignees in my sample are all matched to the DCA data of the corresponding year to make sure that every firm is unique and identifiable.
Second, HJT treats every assignee as an independent entity. Affiliates or subsidiaries of the same firm will be given their own assignee codes and hence will show up as Even if there are significant within-group variations in citation lags, this measure is still consistent with my objective of capturing the efficiency in internal knowledge utilization:
speed as well as scale. A self-citation ratio is high either because the technology is used more internally, or because the internal inventors are able to build on the technology faster, before the external citations take place.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, I seek empirical evidence of the internalization-arbitrage conjecture by analyzing the within-and across-firm variations in the technology structures.
The Econometric Model
Let N k be the number of citations received by patent k, among which n k are self-citations.
As discussed previously, the self-citation ratio n k /N k , which proxies for internal linkages, depends on the external IPR environment as well as the internal firm characteristics.
Econometrically, I choose the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model to reflect three features of the data.
First, most patents received only a small number of citations during the short sample period. A count model is more appropriate than a continuous one when 75% of the patents received fewer than five citations and two self-citations (Hausman et al. 1984 ). In the first step, I focus on the 227 firms that conduct R&D in weak IPR countries and study the within-firm variations. The regression takes the following form:
Second, a negative binomial (NB) model is preferred to a simple
Here foreign and weak are two dummy variables to indicate, respectively, whether the technology is developed in a foreign country and a weak IPR country. Hence, foreign The coefficient on the variable foreign is expected to be negative. Previous studies have
shown that knowledge diffusion is geographically concentrated in nature (Almeida 1996, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1998) . Cross-country knowledge transfer is difficult even within the firm (Teece 1977) . Therefore, I expect the foreign developed patents to be less intertwined with the parent company's knowledge base.
Meanwhile, I expect a positive coefficient on the variable weak. The purpose of R&D in weak IPR countries is to tap the underutilized human capital, and internalization is used as a barrier against imitation. Hence, the internal linkages would be stronger in countries with weak external institutions.
The strong internal linkages may be due to the fact that firms allocate the intrinsically more internalized technologies in weak IPR countries. Alternatively, firms may develop similar technologies at multiple locations, but with different organizational structures.
Supply factors may also play a role here, in the sense that the expertise available in the weak IPR countries happens to fit the needs of highly internalized R&D. These cases are all consistent with the theoretical conjecture. Although a control for technology fields is not necessary from the theoretical point of view, it would be interesting to see empirically whether it is the type of technologies that is driving the differences.
In the second step, I compare across all the firms in my sample and examine whether firms doing R&D in weak IPR countries manifest stronger internal linkages:
Here foreign and weak are the same as defined in the within-firm analysis. f_foreign and Again, the difference in internal linkages across firms may due to their heterogeneous organizational capabilities. It may also arise from the particular technology fields that the firms are involved in. I cannot precisely differentiate these two cases, as the technology fields may be endogenously chosen by firms with different capabilities. For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to identify the relationship between a firm's internal technology structure and its multinational R&D strategies.
In both models, the marginal effect (economic significance) of the independent variables can be calculated as follows:
When the independent variables are dummy variables, the coefficients can be roughly interpreted as the percentage change in the self-citation ratio if the corresponding independent variable changes from 0 to 1:
Within Firms: Differentiated Project Assignment
In this step, I look into the 227 firms that conduct R&D in weak IPR countries, and compare the technologies they develop under different IPR regimes. Table 3 gives the average self-citation ratios for three groups of patents: those developed in weak IPR countries, those developed in strong IPR foreign countries and those developed in the home country (U.S.). As expected, the first group consistently shows higher self-citation ratios than the second, highlighting the effect of external environment. The increasing self-citation ratios over time simply reflect the fact that self-citations happen faster than citations across organizations, and this difference becomes more salient when the observation window gets narrower.
The regression results are shown in Table 4 . Column (1) is the baseline model with 226 firm dummies and eight year-dummies to remove the time effect. Replacing the yeardummies with a trend variable generates similar results. In column (2), I only include firms that have more than 50 patents over the nine-year period. The purpose is to make sure that the results are not driven by misrepresentative observations in small firms.
Since the theoretical conjecture is on firms' internal complementarities, firms above certain R&D scales should be the more appropriate group to study. Statistics show that over half of the citations by US patents are imposed by examiners, rather than voluntarily filed in patent applications (Alcacer and Gittelman 2003) . 13 Although inventors may fail to cite the prior arts for various reasons, it would be farfetched to interpret the examiner-imposed citations as knowledge flows. Luckily, the distinction between inventor-filed and examiner-imposed citations is now available for patents granted after 2000. In column (3), I conduct the test using only voluntary citations made by post-2000 patents.
In the theoretical analysis, I argue that the viability of the internalization-arbitrage strategy may vary widely across industries. It would be informative to examine not only the aggregate, but also the particular technology fields. In Column (4), I control for patent classes to test whether the difference in internal linkages are driven purely by the distribution of technology fields across countries.
14 Column (5) Separate tests are also conducted in other technology categories.
Throughout the specifications the coefficient on the foreign dummy is significantly negative, which confirms the distance effect. Within the same firm, foreign developed patents are 20-30% less likely to be cited by the same firm, compared with those developed in the home country. The difference is even larger in the computer industry.
However, the positive coefficient on the weak dummy nearly offsets all the negative distance effect. This is not trivial if we believe that the weak IPR countries are even further away from the home country in terms of culture, institutions and technological development. The net effect of weak and foreign indicates that technologies developed in 13 I thank Juan Alcacer and Michelle Gittelman for their help on data preparation. 14 The reported result uses the 3-digit U.S. primary patent classes. Fully aware of the caveats with this classification, I also use the International Patent Classes (IPC) for robustness tests. 15 As defined in , this category covers 35 primary patent classes spanning communications, computer hardware & software, computer peripherals, and information storage.
weak IPR countries are intertwined in the firms' internal knowledge base as if they were right at U.S. headquarters! It is worth pointing out that the regression results vary widely across technology fields.
Generally speaking, the coefficients are economically and statistically significant, with the expected signs, in IT, biotechnology, and other "new" industries, but not in traditional areas such as chemical and machinery. This confirms the earlier discussion on the difficulty of decomposing R&D projects and the importance of a broad knowledge base in certain industries.
Finally, I cannot rule out the possibility that the variance in the self-citation ratios is simply driven by the development level of the host countries. Most of the weak IPR countries are also less developed countries. Innovators in those countries have to rely heavily on the knowledge base of the parent companies and therefore produce very firmspecific intellectual properties. This interpretation, however, is still consistent with the theoretical argument. MNEs provide the complementary knowledge that the local talents cannot obtain otherwise. As a result, the generated technologies are less applicable outside the firm boundaries. The low absorptive capacity in the local community does not seem to be the explanation. In fact, the results remain strong even if I only study citations made from U.S.-developed patents.
Across Firms: Organizational Structure
In this step, I compare across firms and examine firm capabilities. Do firms that conduct R&D in weak IPR countries differ systematically from others regarding their knowledge organization? Table 5 gives the average self-citation ratios for three groups of firms:
those with positive patent output in weak IPR countries, those with positive patent output in foreign -but not weak IPR -countries, and those whose R&D is in the home country (U.S.) only. Statistics for large R&D firms are also shown in the table. Consistently, firms with R&D in weak IPR countries show much higher self-citation ratios.
The regression results are shown in Table 6 . Column (1) is the baseline model on the full sample, with fixed year effect. Column (2) constrains the sample to firms with more than 50 patents during the nine-year period. Same as in the within-firm analysis, column (3) removes examiner-imposed citations and limits the sample to voluntary citations received after January 2000. Patent classes are controlled for in Column (4). Column (5) Arguably, firms with R&D in weak IPR countries have proportionally more self-citations simply because they are larger firms. I would like to examine more closely whether the degree of internalization is fully explained by firm size. In Table 7 , I report the regression results controlling for assets (1), sales (2), and the total number of patents owned by the firm (3). I prefer not to include these controls in the main models because it is still consistent with my argument that only large firms have the complementary resources for internalization-arbitrage.
16 Surprisingly, assets and sales both show up with negative coefficients. That is, among firms that do R&D in foreign/weak IPR countries, larger size is associated with even weaker internal linkages, although the marginal effect is almost negligible. Meanwhile, the coefficients on f_weak and f_foreign remain positive and significant. A large patent pool does offer some explanation power to the high degree of self-citations, but the economic significance is, on average, much smaller than that of f_weak and f_foreign.
Similar results are obtained when I use the logarithms of these size variables. Therefore, 16 An alternative argument is that, optimally, firms expand until the organizational cost goes above the benefit of internalization. In that sense, firm size itself reflects organizational capabilities.
the data provide supportive evidence that firms with R&D in weak IPR countries feature stronger internal linkages, even after controlling for firm sizes.
VI. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section, I discuss the caveats in the above analysis and carry out a series of robustness tests to make sure that the results do not depend on the specific setups.
Bias in Using Patent Data
In the absence of a direct measure for innovation, using patent data may generate biases Firms file patents so that they can "exclude others from making, using, or selling the technology in the United States" (USPTO), and claim credit from whoever uses it. Given the nontrivial cost involved in patent applications, firm will only patent a technology if it expects potential uses of the technology by other firms. This is true even when patenting is purely for strategic reasons (Hall and Ziedonis 2001) . Therefore, patents should reflect the part of R&D that is relatively less internalized. Meanwhile, the results of many R&D activities, such as software codes and laboratory tests, are not readily patentable. These activities also tend to be the more firm specific. As a result, self-citation ratios calculated from the patent data would underestimate the overall degree of internal linkages among R&D projects.
Conversations with managers and engineers in the multinational R&D labs in China suggest that most R&D efforts there are not in the patent-oriented category. Only a small proportion of the technologies with the highest stand-alone value will be patented in the U.S.. If non-patentable R&D is more common in the weak IPR countries -which seems to be the case according to observations -then the estimation of internal linkages is biased downward to a larger extent in weak IPR countries than in other countries. If anything, this sample bias goes against my findings and should make the results even more significant. The same logic applies to the analysis of firms.
Biases in Measuring Self-Citations
Due to the changes in firm organizations over the years, the self-citation counts may be To avoid these biases, I eliminate from the sample any assignees that changed their firm affiliations during the sample period. Also eliminated are firms that substantially changed their names, even though the affiliation codes remain the same. This decreased the number of firms in my sample to 1,054.
The same within-firm and across-firm regressions are conducted on the reduced sample, and the results for the two baseline models are reported in Table 8 . Compared with the results in Table 4 and Table 6 , the reduced sample with stable firm affiliations produces even stronger within-and across-firm variations. Controlling for firm effects, patents developed in weak IPR countries are 25% more likely to be cited internally than those developed in other foreign countries. Controlling for locations, firms with R&D in weak IPR countries have about 43% higher self-citation ratios than firms doing R&D in strong IPR countries, and 74% higher than the purely domestic firms.
Alternative Measure of Internal Linkages
There are many forms of internal linkages for an organization, and the self-citation variable is at best an imperfect proxy. The internalization-arbitrage argument would be more convincing if the same pattern can be identified with alternative measures.
One measure that has been developed for this purpose is R&D collaboration across geographic locations (Lahiri 2003) . 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS
Doing R&D in countries with weak IPR protection appears to contradict the comparative advantage theory. With poor institutional environment, these countries are not known for their R&D or technology strengths. This study is an attempt to address the puzzle.
The interviews, the theoretical analysis, and the empirical evidence consistently point to one potential explanation: MNEs may be substituting their internal innovation organizations for the external environment. Thus, firms with closely-knit internal knowledge structures are able to take advantage of the underutilized human capital in weak IPR countries without exposing themselves to too much risk.
This adds to our understanding of a fundamental question in international strategy.
Traditional views focus on firm-specific assets (intangibles, etc.) or location-specific endowment (natural resource, etc.) as the driving forces of internationalization. More recently, Ghemawat (2003) advocates that the foundation for international strategy should be built on the arbitraging of international differences, strategies made possible by internal firm capabilities. This study is a direct illustration of this point: institutional gaps across countries can be an important source of arbitrage opportunities. The study also reveals the internal capabilities required to take advantage of the opportunities. Just as globalization is not for everybody, neither is setting up R&D centers in China or India.
To benefit from R&D internationalization, a firm's internal infrastructure matters.
The analysis also has important implications to the local firms in weak IPR countries. To survive the adverse institutional environment, and to compete effectively with MNEs, the local firms have the alternative of expanding beyond national boundaries and leveraging foreign institutions for value appropriation. In fact, we have already seen this possibility in a few Indian high-tech firms, although the organizational costs are still intimidating for most firms from emerging economies.
For policy makers, this study suggests that MNEs are now able to respond to national policies with global strategies. Firms can leverage one country's institutional environment for their operations in other countries, and public policies in one country may have spillover effects on the effectiveness of other countries' policies. Therefore, policy makers may have to keep a more dynamic view of the problems they are facing.
While identifying the potential opportunities in the adverse environments, I am by no means indicating that poor IPR protection is good either for firms or for the economy. and Casson 1976) and in the line of work on "business groups" (Khanna 2000) . While the intangibility of knowledge makes R&D the ideal field for institutional arbitrage, we have reason to believe that the mechanism applies to other fields too. A study with a broader view would surely deepen our understanding of firms and institutions. -191,527.2 -185,673.7 -83,201.8 -186,562.4 -62,134 .3 *** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level * significant at 10% level Numbers in parentheses ( ) are robust standard errors adjusted for clustering.
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